The State Capitol building is the highest threat level facility on Capitol Hill. It ranks as a Level Four risk on the Federal Threat Assessment System. Among the recommendations made to improve security in and around the building are the following:

- * Remove the entire gas station
- * Monitor the building and grounds continuously by an "untasked" security officer
- * Upgrade the monitors in the camera room; have two monitoring personnel
- * Have deliveries made to a single, secured environment
- * Install security card readers at all doors
- * Secure all electrical equipment with alarms and locks
- * Remove all hedges from around the building
- * Place metal security grates and glass breakage sensors on all ground floor windows
- * Remove pine trees from the grounds, or trim them clean up to 7' above grade

Although not considered a high security risk, the State Office Building is rated a Level Three building using the Federal Threat Assessment System. Recommended security remedies include:

- * Add reception counter at two public entries
- * Have camera monitoring of lobbies on two main floors
- * Install a security gate in the dock area
- * Monitor all other doors with cameras and/or alarms
- * Improve security doors at the state's emergency command center on bottom floor
- * Place the command center under CCTV surveillance
- * Place cameras at key exterior areas around building

The State Archives Building, if retained, would be considered a Level Two facility and should be monitored more regularly by the private guard service. The Grounds Maintenance Building, if retained, should have more secure doors and be kept locked when not in use. The adjacent pile of concrete should be removed. This needs to be monitored with an operable camera.

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I can see several things that caused me some concern with this building. This building while probably not a high target building, its proximity to the state capitol is cause for concern. I would list this building as a level three building using the Federal Threat Assessment System.

- 1. There are several entrances to this building. Most are for the ease of employees and not the public. I see only two entrances that would get used heavily for the public. They would be found on the first and second floors. The second floor has a guard station on it already.
 - 1. The two entrances previously mentioned need to have a reception counter added to them so the public will have a contact person when entering the building. Whether this person is a state employee or a contract guard is up to the state. The other entrances for this building need to have card access only. This would still allow employees use but limit the public.
 - 2. There is a camera in the lobby areas of these two floors. I would verify they are working and being monitored. These cameras with signage placed strategically around the building mentioning AThis building monitored by CCTV for prosecution of criminal actions@
- 2. There is a dock area to this building that is not monitored. Beside the dock area is several generators and the fuel storage to run them. This dock is found so that a truck bomb placed there would devastate two wings of the building causing it to collapse the entire structure. Also, in this area a door to the basement level was found propped open with a piece of wood.
 - 1. A gate needs to be installed to this dock area. Diesel fuel is very hard to get ignited, but once ignited is a very good source of fuel for a bomb. There are options to a gate, such as using an arm, or a retractable barrier. Whatever is used should be situated so no one can enter without being monitored and access granted by security personnel.
 - 2. All doors, especially those hidden from view should be monitored either by alarm or camera, to keep unauthorized entry from being made.
- 3. The state's emergency command center is found on the bottom floor. This is reached by the elevators, the dock area, and through an underground tunnel. This center would be used in any state emergency. It was last used on the millennium change over and the tornado before that. The press coverage on the millennium change mentioned its location and existence. Hinges to the doors of this building are found on the hallway side of the door. In addition while doing the survey two people exited this area that has card access. I was able to catch the door before it closed and examine it. Both of the parties left with me holding the door.

- 1. Several fixes should be made to this important facility. Due to the nature of its design and use it is probably the most vital area of the building. I would recommend that the hinges be reversed or replaced with security style hinges. Security hinges have allen screws placed in them so the hinge cannot be removed.
- Besides the hinges I would recommend that any future press coverage not be allowed to mention the location or function of the facility.
- The doors to the area should be moved, approximately 15' to the west. This would move the tunnel and vital computer areas on this floor within the protective area of the center.
- I would place this area under CCTV surveillance, and mandate the identification be shown before any entry is allowed.
- 4. The perimeter of the building has the ventilation right next to the building. While it is secured from entry with the use of U-bolts there are other concerns. The grate on it allows particles to be thrown down the shafts. A biological agent such as anthrax or several similar diseases could be dropped down there as someone walks by. This would then enter the ventilation and be mixed into the air that hundreds of people breathe. No one would even know they were infected until days after the event.
 - Cameras placed observing the grates and signage telling people the area is monitored by surveillance would help. The cameras would also be observing an area that was recently remodeled. This area encourages pedestrian traffic in it by the placing of benches and brighter lighting. The cameras would help crime prevention there as well.

STATE ARCHIVES AND SURROUNDING DFCM BUILDINGS

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This building while not confrontational in its job function does lend itself to having clientele who might be anti-government in its feelings. Groups called constitutionalists tend to frequent the archives= area to check on a current oath of office statements. This building would be a level two on the Federal Threat Assessment System.

- 5. The library section of the archives is found at the back of the building. This allows the other employees not to frequent and makes this area isolated. The library would be an area the afore mentioned group might frequent.
 - 1. The private guard service contracted with the state is supposed to make rounds to this building. In conversation with the employees it was learned that one guard comes around regularly, but the other guards do not. The company should be contacted and it should be brought to their attention that visits should be regular but not any pattern set.
- 6. The other buildings in this area had more problems with it. Attached to the Archives building is a grounds building. In this is stored thousands of dollars of lawn equipment. The door was found wide open, and I was able to spend about ten minutes in there.
 - 1. The problem with the door is it snags on the frame. It was locked but no one verified that it had closed securely. With this location being tied to maintenance I would assume someone can fix the screws that were sticking out and keeping the door from closing.
- 7. This building also had a big pile of concrete next to it. It was piled high enough and is of a material that would be beneficial to a criminal in committing a crime or getting to the building roof.
 - 1. I would eliminate the pile of concrete and clean the area out. It would deter anyone from using the material for illegal purposes.
- 8. The whole area has know one watching it. There are several areas in which you could hide. It would be possible to steal anything from back there, or assault whomever might walk by.
 - 1. This area needs to be monitored. It should be designed so that there is only one entry point by vehicle. This should also be monitored with a camera in a secured housing.

This is the highest threat level of all buildings on Capitol Hill as it is called. At certain times of the year this threat level would go up even more and security should be designed so that could happen. Targets are picked based on several things. The two most used are symbolism, and rage. In a government system the biggest building would be the symbol, the rage would be to try to destroy all the government at once. This would mean a building like the Capitol as the target and probably during the legislature or very important meeting. Due to this, the building should be a level four on the Federal Threat Assessment System.

Due to the size of the building and grounds all security should address both locations as one. To not bullet proof key windows but allow trees and locations for a sniper defeats your protecting any of the State Capitol at all. A conscience effort as to the entire security plans should always be addressed.

- 9. One area that needs to be eliminated as quickly as possible is the garage area of the Capitol. In other times having the gas pumps was convenient. Due to the change in human behavior and the growth of violence this just adds an element of danger. The location so close to the building is another source of concern. A small explosive device used in that area would add to the acceleration of the bomb.
 - 1. This whole area needs to be removed. If state dispensing sites are not available in the area and pumps need to be on the site, I would move the pumps to the farthest corner of the grounds and place it there.
- 10. Security must be a top priority for the entire grounds. Presently there are two groups in charge of security. The State Department of Public Safety is police presence and Burns security has a limited scope of authority in some areas. The DPS officers need to be available always. Right now they might be involved with another building or tied up doing money escorts.
 - 1. It is a good sound security practice always to have at least one officer that would stay un tasked. This officer would always be available for emergency calls.
- 11. The camera room that is currently being used has several problems. The most obvious is the amount of cameras that are being monitored by one person. Studies have shown that even the most dedicated employee can only observe so much. The more tasks given the more their attention is spread and the opportunity to miss something is likely. This coupled with small monitors and extremely long shifts just increases all the probabilities that something is going to be missed.
 - 1. This room needs to have a large monitor that any camera can be turned to so that observers can see exactly what caught their eye. Other monitors should be placed so that they are available to be seen from the employee who is sitting in their chair watching the bigger screen. The employees in the room need to frequent breaks and preferably two people in there so if one gets eye strain they can be relieved for a minute.

- 12. While talking on DPS and their manning of the Police services provided, their function in this situation is not only law enforcement but also in security type work. Anyone in the field can tell you that these areas are similar but different. People must be willing to work on both.
 - 1. I would highly recommend that the DPS officers assigned to this detail or at least their leadership join ASIS (American Society of Industrial Security). This organization is the biggest and largest organization of security professionals in the world. They would make some very good contacts and resources.
- 13. Procedures for the building could be improved. While conducting this survey, it was observed that the East side dock doors were wide open. We could open this door and walk into the lower level. If I had packed a truck with explosive, I could park it there, and use the fuel pumps located less than 20 feet from this dock to blow up the building. I could also have used this door to unload several packages of small explosives. No one is there to monitor deliveries.
 - 1. Procedures for deliveries need to be done in a secured environment. The drivers need to be met by either security or facilities people and shipments verified. This could be accomplished by allowing trucks only one access point to the building.
- 14. In another procedural issue the entrances on the basement are opened. This includes those not usually used by the public. If I wanted to get into this building unseen, I would use one of those entrances then mingle with the public once inside.
 - 1. Card readers established on all doors help you control the flow of the public. Readers on those doors to the North and even to the West deter the public from using it and still allows the employees to use the doors.
- 15. To cause a moment of pandemonium or to disguise ones true intentions facility controls are a likely target. Finding these key targets are not hard. They look like panel boxes in peoples own houses, or the duct work is seen in the basements of the buildings. Why we work in these environments every day, we just expect them to work. If we lose power in our technology world, we know that business shuts down. To take out several boxes puts the building out of work for several days.
 - 1. To protect the building from a person who wanted to disrupt services, or to set up a diversionary tactic all electrical boxes, wires, and rooms should be secured with alarms and locks.
- 16. In walking the grounds of the facilities we got right up next to the building due to the types of shrubs used in the landscaping. This landscaping while practical 30

years ago, is not practical now. This building was built with basement windows and access points. The shrubbery placed in around the base of the Capitol opens an environment in which people can hide things, grow things, or even live depending on the time of the year and frequency of patrols in the area.

- I would remove all hedge style bushes from around the base of the building. At a minimum you should trim them back extensively. If they are pulled, I would decorate with a plant native to the wild plains of Utah that doesn=t provide cover for anyone of a criminal or deviant behavior.
- In the above item basement windows were mentioned. These provide for an additional access point that needs to be monitored. People wanting to cause damage to a building or a person will look for a way to do it without being seen. If I could enter a building at night without being seen that would be the first place to go to.
 - Windows placed on the ground floor should have grates placed over them. The mounting of these grates should be done with sufficient lag bolts so that they cannot be removed or broken off. Glass breakage sensors on windows on the first floor are also effective.
- One of the last things I would like to discuss is the trees on the campus. With the public access and use of the grounds any tree or shrub becomes a potential liability factor. If the wind topples them onto a car or person. If a jogger is attacked because the perpetrator was hiding behind one of them. Landscaping needs to be as carefully planned as the construction of the building on the grounds.
 - I would recommend removing all pine trees from the grounds. Understanding that the Blue Spruce is the State Tree and probably should be displayed on the grounds I would offer the following. All trees despite type should be trimmed at a minimum of 7'. That means that a six-foot tall man could not hide in the branches as easily. It also gives police officers a clear line of vision when patrolling the grounds. It should be mentioned that if the trees sit on a hill the tree needs to be cut higher. The ultimate goal is to accomplish the clear line of sight.

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